The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) is undergoing a period of pronounced organisational strain following the death of Raila Odinga in October 2025. For over two decades, Raila functioned not merely as party leader but as the party’s principal integrating mechanism. His personal authority substituted for institutionalised succession rules, mediated factional disputes, and aggregated diverse ethnic and regional interests under a single political umbrella. In political science terms, ODM exhibited characteristics of a charismatic or personalist party rather than a routinised, bureaucratic organisation (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
With Raila’s departure, that centripetal force has disappeared. What remains is an organisation that must suddenly rely on procedures, constitutional offices, and negotiated authority, tools that were historically secondary to Raila’s personal arbitration. Unsurprisingly, latent tensions have surfaced. Rival centres of influence are now jostling for strategic control ahead of the highly consequential 2027 Kenyan general election. The immediate question is institutional: can ODM survive the transition from personality-driven cohesion to rule-based organisation without fragmenting?
ODM’s Internal Realignment: Continuity versus Pragmatism
The formal party apparatus moved quickly to preserve continuity. Raila’s elder brother, Dr. Oburu Oginga, assumed a symbolic leadership role, projecting stability and legacy preservation. Concurrently, Secretary-General Edwin Sifuna has emphasised internal constitutionalism, party discipline, and organisational coherence. His position is anchored in institutional legitimacy rather than personal proximity to Raila.
This camp frames ODM’s future in terms of electoral autonomy and constitutional opposition, resisting what they interpret as over-accommodation with President William Ruto’s Kenya Kwanza administration. Their argument is strategic: if ODM loses its oppositional identity, it risks becoming indistinguishable from the government it once contested, thereby eroding its voter base.
By contrast, another current within the party regards cooperation with the ruling coalition as pragmatic. In Kenya’s political economy, proximity to the executive frequently determines access to development funds, appointments, and patronage networks. From this perspective, engagement with the state is not ideological capitulation but survival strategy. As Horowitz (2022) observes, Kenyan parties often operate within clientelist systems where resource distribution, rather than policy programmes, structures political competition.
This divergence exposes a core strategic dilemma: is ODM better served by ideological clarity or tactical proximity to power? Does institutional purity matter more than immediate influence? These questions are not abstract; they directly shape mobilisation, funding, and electoral viability.
The Emergence of Oketch Salah: Narrative as Political Capital
Amid these structural battles, Oketch Salah has emerged as a controversial and disruptive figure. Prior to late 2025, Salah had limited formal political standing. His rise has been based almost entirely on a personal narrative: that he enjoyed intimate proximity to Raila Odinga during his final illness and that he represents continuity with Raila’s unfinished political mission.
By presenting himself as an “adopted son” and invoking his alleged presence at Raila’s bedside, Salah has attempted to convert biographical association into political legitimacy. His strategy reflects a broader pattern common in personalist political systems: when institutional credentials are weak, actors substitute symbolic or emotional claims to authority.
This phenomenon aligns with scholarship on political mobilisation under uncertainty. Eliaz, Galperti, and Spiegler (2022) argue that in environments where authority structures are contested, personalised narratives even those weakly verified can shape political behaviour because followers seek cognitive anchors. Salah’s appeal, therefore, does not require formal endorsement; it requires only that enough supporters accept his story.
Yet this raises further analytical questions. Can narrative legitimacy substitute for organisational authority? Or does it intensify fragmentation by bypassing established procedures?
Family Backlash and the Politics of Legacy Control
The Odinga family’s swift repudiation of Salah reveals the stakes of narrative control. Winnie Odinga publicly dismissed his claims as “a flat-out lie,” while Raila Odinga Jr. labelled them “nonsense.” These statements were not simply emotional responses; they were political acts. By denying Salah’s proximity, the family sought to reclaim symbolic ownership over Raila’s legacy. ODM’s national leadership reinforced this position, clarifying that Salah’s activities occur in a personal capacity and do not reflect official party strategy. The message was unambiguous: legitimacy flows through institutions, not personal storytelling.
This episode underscores a deeper reality of Kenyan politics. Legacies are political resources. Control over the memory of Raila Odinga, his intentions, final wishes, and political meaning translates into mobilisation power. The contest over who speaks for Raila is therefore a contest over who commands his support base.
Does this family-institutional alignment strengthen ODM by clarifying authority boundaries? Or does it reveal the fragility of a party that must rely on familial endorsement to validate leadership?
Structural Context: Ethnicity, Clientelism, and Party Fragility
These internal disputes must be situated within the broader structure of Kenyan political competition. Multi-ethnic democracies often develop party systems organised around ethnic blocs and patronage linkages rather than ideological programmes (Posner, 2005). Kenya exemplifies this pattern.
Horowitz (2022) demonstrates that voting behaviour frequently reflects communal calculations about representation and access to state resources. In such contexts, leaders act as brokers for ethnic constituencies rather than programmatic policymakers. Parties become vehicles for elite bargaining.
ODM historically managed this reality through Raila’s cross-ethnic appeal and long-standing opposition identity. Without him, the coalition risks reverting to its constituent fragments. This makes institutionalisation urgent but difficult. Personalist parties rarely transition smoothly into bureaucratic ones (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Thus, the current turbulence is not merely a succession problem; it is a structural stress test.
The Broader Opposition: Coalition Arithmetic and Strategic Bargaining
Beyond ODM, the wider opposition landscape is equally fluid. Former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, now repositioned as an opposition figure after impeachment, has emphasised unity as paramount. His rhetoric is bluntly arithmetic. “We are steadfast and will remain united in the Opposition. We will liberate this country together,” he has stated, adding that whoever becomes the opposition candidate will receive consolidated support from Mt. Kenya voters. This bloc logic reflects classic coalition politics. Votes are treated as negotiable assets aggregated through elite bargains. The goal is not ideological synthesis but numerical sufficiency.
Kalonzo Musyoka illustrates the tensions inherent in this model. While supporting opposition unity, he has declared, “I cannot be anyone’s running mate again,” framing 2027 as a final opportunity to lead. His stance reveals the central contradiction of coalition politics: every leader wants unity, but each also wants to head the ticket.
How, then, can unity be achieved when ambition is evenly distributed? At what point does coalition bargaining become fragmentation?
Martha Karua offers a somewhat different orientation. Her politics emphasise constitutional reform, anti-corruption, and institutional accountability. Yet research on Kenyan elections suggests that reformist platforms often struggle against entrenched clientelist networks (Gichohi, 2021). Normative appeals alone rarely defeat patronage systems without strong organisational machinery.
James Orengo and other veteran figures similarly stress legal and institutional contestation. Their approach privileges constitutionalism over charisma. However, institutional politics may not mobilise voters as effectively as ethnic or populist appeals.
The Strategic Road to 2027
Taken together, these dynamics suggest that the 2027 election will hinge on two processes: internal consolidation within ODM and external coalition engineering among opposition leaders. If ODM fragments while opposition elites compete separately, the incumbent’s position strengthens by default. Divided opposition votes historically favour the sitting president. Conversely, a unified coalition spanning Mt Kenya, Ukambani, Luo-Nyanza, and Western regions could alter the electoral calculus significantly.
Coalition theory indicates that durable alliances require credible commitments and shared incentives (Bagarello, 2015). Without mechanisms to enforce cooperation such as agreed candidate selection procedures or power-sharing formulas. alliances tend to collapse under pressure. The opposition therefore faces a practical challenge: can it institutionalize cooperation rather than rely on personal goodwill?
Conclusion: From Personalism to Institutions
The post-Raila moment exposes ODM and the broader opposition at a crossroads. The rise and backlash of Oketch Salah demonstrate how quickly informal actors exploit leadership vacuums. The party’s internal factionalism reveals the limits of charisma-based organisation. Meanwhile, opposition leaders negotiate coalitions through bloc arithmetic and strategic positioning.
The fundamental question is institutional. Can Kenya’s opposition evolve beyond personalist and ethnic brokerage politics toward durable, programmatic organisation? Or will it remain a shifting assemblage of leaders bound only by temporary convenience? The answer will shape not only the 2027 election but the long-term quality of democratic competition in Kenya.
References
Bagarello, F. (2015). Coalition dynamics and alliance stability. arXiv Working Paper.
Eliaz, K., Galperti, S., & Spiegler, R. (2022). False narratives and political mobilisation. arXiv Working Paper.
Gichohi, M. (2021). Women’s presidential campaigns and structural barriers in Kenya. Oxford University Press.
Horowitz, J. (2022). The ethnic foundations of electoral politics in Kenya. Oxford University Press.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
Posner, D. (2005). Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa. Cambridge University Press.
