As Tanzania approaches its October elections, the country stands at an important juncture. It is often praised as one of Africa’s most stable states—marked by national cohesion, relative peace, and steady governance since independence. Yet beneath this stability lies a system that is neither a full democracy nor an outright autocracy. Instead, it reflects what Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky (2002) describe as “competitive authoritarianism.”
In such systems, elections are held regularly and opposition parties are allowed to contest. However, incumbents enjoy structural advantages so significant that true alternation of power remains unlikely. Tanzania’s ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has governed continuously since independence. Its extensive grassroots networks, especially in rural areas, combined with control over state resources and institutions, give it a strong advantage over challengers. While opposition parties campaign energetically, the system is not designed to make turnover of power easy.
This trajectory is not unique to Tanzania. Across Africa, variations of competitive authoritarianism are evident. In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement has maintained power for nearly four decades, combining developmental policies with tight control over dissent (Tripp, 2010). Kenya, meanwhile, has institutionalized multiparty competition, but its elections are often marked by polarization and disputes (Cheeseman, 2018). Zambia presents a contrasting example: in 2021, Hakainde Hichilema’s opposition campaign defeated the incumbent, showing that even entrenched regimes can open under certain conditions (Resnick, 2021). Tanzania thus sits within a regional spectrum where states balance pluralism with varying degrees of control.
This leads to a second debate central to African political thought: should states prioritize democracy or development? Anna Lekvall (2014) frames this as the dilemma of “development first, democracy later?” In Tanzania, the argument resonates. Since independence, successive governments have emphasized social services, education, and infrastructure. Many citizens often judge government performance not by the openness of political competition, but by tangible improvements in livelihoods.
Yet, as Thandika Mkandawire (2001) reminds us, the African state has long been demonized—labeled “rentier, patrimonial, parasitic, kleptocratic”—precisely because of the ways it has been used to entrench power. However, Mkandawire also argued that the state is indispensable for fostering development. Tanzania reflects this paradox vividly: it is a state that invests in education and healthcare while simultaneously narrowing political freedoms and consolidating ruling-party dominance.
Looking ahead to October 2025, Tanzania’s elections are unlikely to produce dramatic change. CCM’s dominance remains strong. But the deeper story lies in how Tanzania continues to balance its commitments to stability, development, and democratic aspirations.
Why Tanzania’s Path Matters Beyond Its Borders?
For international partners—donors, observers, investors—Tanzania’s model offers both opportunities and challenges. Its stability, relative peace, and focus on development make it an attractive partner for investment and aid. Roads, ports, and energy projects create economic prospects that matter not just domestically but for regional integration in East Africa.
Yet the limits of political openness raise important questions. A state that prioritizes stability and development while curbing pluralism may deliver short-term progress but risks narrowing civic space and slowing innovation in the long run. For international actors, the challenge is to support Tanzania’s developmental ambitions while encouraging incremental democratic deepening.
Tanzania’s political trajectory thus carries lessons well beyond its borders. It reflects the broader African search for a governance model that is both developmental and democratic—capable of delivering prosperity without sacrificing pluralism. How Tanzania manages this balance in the coming years will shape not only its own future but also wider debates on Africa’s political and economic paths in the 21st century.
References
Cheeseman, N. (2018). Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lekvall, A. (2014). Development First, Democracy Later? Stockholm: International IDEA.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65.
Mkandawire, T. (2001). Thinking about Developmental States in Africa. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25(3), 289–314.
Resnick, D. (2021). Zambia’s Democratic Resilience: Lessons from 2021 Elections. Journal of Southern African Studies, 47(6), 961–975.
Tripp, A. M. (2010). Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
