There are wars that begin with gunfire, and there are wars that begin with maps. In East Africa, one of the most consequential struggles of the coming decades belongs to the second category. It is being fought not primarily with soldiers, but with ports, railways, highways, pipelines, customs systems and investment capital. From Mombasa to Dar es Salaam, from Kampala to Kigali, from the copper belt of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the shores of Lake Tanganyika, the geography of commerce is being redrawn.
The central analytical claim is therefore that corridor power should be understood as a relational form of geoeconomic power. A port becomes strategically consequential when it is embedded in a dependable chain of rail, road, lake transport, customs, finance and production; conversely, infrastructure alone does not guarantee durable commercial dependence. This distinction places connectivity, rather than territorial control, at the centre of the analysis (Castells, 1996; Khanna, 2016).
Parag Khanna’s Connectography offers a useful starting point for understanding this transformation. His central argument is that connectivity increasingly shapes geopolitical power: states and regions derive influence not only from territorial control but also from their position within networks of infrastructure, trade and communication (Khanna, 2016). In East Africa, this logic is becoming particularly visible.
The competition between Kenya and Tanzania is therefore about more than two ports. Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are competing to become indispensable gateways to a vast hinterland containing some of the region’s fastest-growing economies and some of Africa’s most strategically important natural resources. Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, Zambia and the eastern DRC all sit within the gravitational field of these competing corridors.
Yet calling this a conventional “war” would be misleading. It is better understood as a geoeconomic competition overflows: a struggle to attract cargo, investment, industrial activity, logistics companies and long-term commercial dependence. The prize is not simply the container that enters a port today. It is the network of economic relationships that follows it.
Historical Path Dependence and Tanzania’s Challenge to Mombasa
Kenya’s position did not emerge accidentally. The colonial railway linking the Kenyan coast to the interior created an economic geography in which Mombasa became the principal maritime gateway for Uganda and much of the Great Lakes region. Transport infrastructure subsequently reinforced this path dependence. The EAC today defines the Northern Corridor as beginning at Mombasa and extending through Kenya towards Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern DRC. The Central Corridor, by contrast, begins at Dar es Salaam and reaches Tanzania’s hinterland and the Great Lakes region.
The transformation of Tanzania’s logistics strategy accelerated during the 2010s and has continued under President Samia Suluhu Hassan. The Central Corridor is increasingly conceived not simply as a national transport route but as a regional economic artery linking the port of Dar es Salaam with the Great Lakes and parts of Central and Southern Africa. Tanzania’s geography gives this strategy particular significance: the country borders eight states, has direct access to the Indian Ocean, and is connected to both Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria. This position gives Tanzania the potential to function as a bridge between maritime East Africa, the Great Lakes and the wider African interior.
The historical advantage of Mombasa is therefore best understood as institutional and infrastructural path dependence rather than as a permanent structural monopoly. Existing routes, commercial relationships and accumulated logistics capabilities can lower transaction costs for established users, but competing corridors can alter these incentives when they offer credible improvements in cost, time or reliability. Tanzania’s strategy consequently represents an attempt to change the geography of choice rather than simply to expand national transport capacity
As Krugman (1991) demonstrates in his work on economic geography, geographical advantage becomes economically meaningful when transport networks reduce the cost of accessing markets. Tanzania’s current infrastructure strategy can therefore be understood as an attempt to convert geographical position into regional logistical power.
The railway has become the central instrument of this strategy. Tanzania chose an electrified standard-gauge railway and has developed the SGR in successive phases towards the interior, with the objective of increasing freight capacity and reducing dependence on road transport. Its significance therefore extends beyond faster passenger travel: an efficient freight railway can lower transport costs, increase reliability and connect the coast with inland production and consumption centres.
The Tabora–Kigoma section is particularly strategic. In July 2026, Tanzania launched construction of the 506-kilometre SGR section, extending the railway towards Lake Tanganyika. Kigoma is not simply a railway terminus; its position on Lake Tanganyika creates possibilities for multimodal connections towards Burundi and eastern DRC. The project consequently gives the Central Corridor greater geographical depth and strengthens its potential to connect Dar es Salaam with the Great Lakes.
This development illustrates Manuel Castells’ concept of the “space of flows,” in which economic power increasingly depends on networks through which goods, capital, information and people circulate across territories (Castells, 1996). The Central Corridor is consequently evolving from a linear transport route into a potentially interconnected logistics network linking port, railway, lake transport, borders and inland markets. Its strategic value will ultimately depend not on the number of kilometres of railway constructed, but on whether Tanzania can integrate these different modes of transport into a reliable and cost-efficient system. As the World Bank’s analysis of East African trade corridors demonstrates, differences in transport costs and transit times can significantly influence the choice of gateway for landlocked economies (World Bank, 2022). Tanzania’s railway strategy is therefore geopolitical as much as logistical: it seeks to make Dar es Salaam not merely a Tanzanian port, but a competitive gateway to the Great Lakes and the African interior.
Mombasa possesses the advantage of historical path dependence, but Tanzania is attempting to overcome that advantage by constructing an alternative regional logistics geography around Dar es Salaam.
Railways, Transit Costs, and Competition for the Hinterland
The railway has become the most visible instrument of this rivalry. Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway initially transformed the Mombasa–Nairobi connection, and its extension towards western Kenya and Uganda has renewed the strategic importance of the Northern Corridor. In March 2026, Kenya formally launched construction of the Naivasha–Kisumu–Malaba SGR extension: 264 km from Naivasha to Kisumu, including an 8.69 km branch towards the proposed Kisumu Port, followed by 107 km from Kisumu to Malaba.
Tanzania is pursuing a parallel strategy through its expanding SGR network and the development of connections towards the interior and Great Lakes region. The significance of these projects should not, however, be measured simply by kilometres of railway constructed. Transport economics demonstrates that corridor competitiveness depends on the total cost and reliability of moving goods from origin to destination. The World Bank’s analysis of Rwanda’s trade corridors, for example, found that Dar es Salaam was 187 kilometres closer to Kigali than Mombasa and that, in 2020, road transport from Dar es Salaam to Kigali took approximately 90 hours compared with more than 180 hours from Mombasa; the difference translated into nearly US$500 per container under prevailing conditions.
The comparison also demonstrates why corridor competition should be assessed through total logistics performance rather than infrastructure length. Transit time, border procedures, reliability and cost interact across the entire route. A new railway can therefore strengthen a corridor only to the extent that it reduces the generalised cost of moving goods from producer to market and connects effectively with the wider logistics system
This supports Manuel Castells’ concept of the “space of flows.” In The Rise of the Network Society, Castells argues that contemporary economic activity is increasingly organised through networks rather than isolated territorial spaces (Castells, 1996). The strategic value of a railway therefore lies not in the railway itself, but in its integration with ports, customs systems, roads, warehouses, markets and productive centres.
The decisive contest is not over which state possesses the longest railway, but which corridor can offer the lowest total logistics cost, the shortest reliable transit time and the greatest integration with productive economies.
The DRC and the Expansion of the Corridor Hinterland
The accession of the DRC to the East African Community fundamentally changed the scale of the competition. In March 2022, the EAC admitted the DRC as its seventh Partner State, and the accession treaty was formally signed in April of the same year. The EAC described the development as an expansion of the Community towards new “trade-centered partnerships” and emphasised the potential for increased trade and investment.
The DRC’s accession consequently changes the analytical scale of the corridor question. The relevant market is no longer adequately described as the immediate hinterland of either coastal port; it is a wider regional network in which mineral production, consumer markets, transport infrastructure and institutional integration intersect. The expansion of the EAC creates opportunities for greater connectivity, but it does not by itself resolve the logistical and administrative constraints that determine whether those opportunities become sustained trade flows.
The importance of the DRC is both geographical and economic. Its eastern provinces are physically connected to the Great Lakes region, while the country possesses major deposits of copper and cobalt and a large domestic market. Its integration into the EAC therefore creates an enormous potential hinterland for both Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. Kenya has an incentive to strengthen connections through Uganda towards eastern DRC, while Tanzania can utilise the Central Corridor and Lake Tanganyika system to reach the same broad economic space.
The competition is consequently not only about transporting minerals or consumer goods. As Baldwin (2016) argues in The Great Convergence, contemporary trade is increasingly organised through complex production and logistics networks in which services, knowledge, finance and infrastructure accompany the movement of physical goods. The corridor capable of attracting warehousing, insurance, banking, processing and manufacturing can capture considerably more value than a corridor that merely transports cargo.
The DRC may become the decisive variable in East African corridor competition because its size, resources and geographical position give it the capacity to reshape regional trade flows.
Uganda and Rwanda as Corridor-Diversification Actors
The rivalry becomes even more interesting when viewed from the perspective of landlocked states. Uganda and Rwanda do not necessarily have to become permanent clients of one maritime gateway. Their ability to diversify routes gives them bargaining power over transport costs, customs arrangements and infrastructure investment. This is consistent with the economic logic of diversification: dependence on a single corridor creates vulnerability, whereas access to multiple routes increases strategic choice.
From this perspective, Uganda and Rwanda should be treated as active corridor actors rather than passive hinterland economies. Their capacity to diversify routes gives them leverage over the terms on which infrastructure and logistics services are provided. Corridor competition therefore redistributes bargaining power: coastal gateways seek cargo, while landlocked economies can use alternative routes to reduce dependence and negotiate for improved service quality and lower costs.
The East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) provides a particularly important illustration. The selected route begins in Kabaale–Hoima in Uganda and extends to the Chongoleani Peninsula near Tanga in Tanzania. The pipeline is approximately 1,443 kilometres long, with 296 kilometres in Uganda and 1,147 kilometres in Tanzania. Its significance extends beyond petroleum: it demonstrates how infrastructure can create durable economic relationships between landlocked producers and coastal gateways.
Edward Luttwak’s concept of geoeconomics is therefore particularly relevant. In his seminal 1990 article, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce,” Luttwak argued that economic instruments increasingly perform strategic functions traditionally associated with military power. He famously described the emerging shift as one in which “the methods of commerce are displacing military methods,” with capital, innovation and market penetration replacing traditional instruments of power (Luttwak, 1990).
Uganda and Rwanda gain strategic value not by choosing permanently between Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, but by maintaining the ability to use competing corridors and negotiate from a position of diversification.
Ports, Logistics Ecosystems, and International Capital
The struggle between Kenya and Tanzania is also becoming a contest for international investment. Ports are no longer simply maritime facilities; they are nodes within global supply chains. Tanzania’s 2023 agreement with DP World illustrates this transformation. DP World signed a 30-year concession to operate and modernise Dar es Salaam Port, initially committing more than US$250 million, with potential investment of up to US$1 billion during the concession period and associated hinterland logistics projects (DP World, 2023). The significance of the agreement lies not merely in the capital committed, but in the attempt to integrate port operations with a wider logistics ecosystem connecting Tanzania and its hinterland to global markets.
This development matters because port competitiveness depends upon the wider ecosystem surrounding the port. Shipping lines, freight forwarders, banks, insurance companies, manufacturers, warehouses and transport operators respond to the reliability and cost of the entire logistics chain. The World Bank’s corridor analysis similarly demonstrates that port choice is sensitive to price, transit time, shipping services and logistics performance rather than geography alone.
The implication is that Kenya and Tanzania are not simply competing for ships. They are competing for the economic activity generated by those ships: industrial investment, distribution centres, financial services, logistics companies and regional supply chains.
The true strategic prize is not control of a port but control of the logistics ecosystem that transforms cargo flows into long-term economic value.
Corridor Competition and the Institutional Problem of Regional Integration
Competition between corridors can be beneficial when it forces governments to improve infrastructure and reduce transport costs. It becomes counterproductive when infrastructure is driven primarily by national prestige rather than regional economic efficiency. East African integration continues to face non-tariff barriers, administrative obstacles and infrastructure weaknesses. Calabrese and Mendez-Parra (2016) found that “inadequate infrastructure and customs procedures” remained important causes of non-tariff barriers within the EAC, while governments’ failure to establish effective coordination mechanisms contributed to their persistence.
The institutional dimension is therefore as important as the infrastructure race itself. If customs, border management and regulatory systems remain fragmented, the gains created by faster rail and improved port capacity can be dissipated at interfaces between jurisdictions. Regional integration is consequently not simply a question of building more infrastructure; it is also a question of making infrastructure interoperable through common procedures, information systems and predictable rules.
This problem is important because a modern railway cannot compensate indefinitely for inefficient borders. A container can move rapidly across hundreds of kilometres and still lose its economic advantage if it spends excessive time at customs posts, encounters duplicated documentation or faces unpredictable administrative charges. Winters and Mendez-Parra (2017) similarly demonstrate that logistical and transport barriers impose substantial costs on East African trade.
The appropriate policy response is therefore not to create an exclusive “Kenyan corridor” or “Tanzanian corridor,” but to develop interoperable regional infrastructure: harmonised customs procedures, digital cargo tracking, one-stop border posts, compatible railway standards and transparent transit regimes. Such measures would allow cargo to move according to efficiency rather than political preference.
Corridor competition should reduce the cost of regional integration; if it instead reproduces administrative fragmentation, the infrastructure race will produce less integration rather than more.
Conclusion
The competition between Mombasa and Dar es Salaam should therefore be understood as a manifestation of a broader transformation in African geopolitics. Power is increasingly exercised through infrastructure, connectivity and the ability to organise economic flows. Khanna argues that “the true map of the world should feature not just states but megacities, highways, railways, pipelines, Internet cables, and other symbols of our emerging global network civilization” (Khanna, 2016).
Castells reaches a related conclusion from the perspective of network society: economic and political processes increasingly operate through networks that transcend territorial boundaries (Castells, 1996). Luttwak’s geoeconomic framework explains why states consequently compete through investment, commerce and infrastructure as much as through traditional geopolitical instruments.
Kenya retains a powerful structural advantage through Mombasa and the Northern Corridor, while Tanzania is constructing an increasingly credible alternative around Dar es Salaam, the Central Corridor, the SGR and its Great Lakes connections. The accession of the DRC has enlarged the potential hinterland of both systems, while Uganda and Rwanda possess growing incentives to diversify their commercial routes. The question is therefore not simply whether Mombasa will defeat Dar es Salaam or whether Dar es Salaam will overtake Mombasa. The deeper question is whether East Africa will allow these competing networks to become instruments of fragmentation or transform them into complementary components of regional integration.
This framing also cautions against treating corridor rivalry as a zero-sum contest. The available evidence supports a more conditional interpretation: competition can improve infrastructure and service provision when users can shift between routes, while institutional fragmentation can reduce the benefits of investment. The strategic trajectory of East African connectivity will therefore depend on the interaction between national infrastructure strategies and regional mechanisms for interoperability, trade facilitation and multimodal coordination (Calabrese & Mendez-Parra, 2016; Gasiorek et al., 2017).
The strategic implication is not that one corridor must prevail over the other, but that the benefits of competition depend on whether infrastructure investment is accompanied by interoperable institutions, predictable border procedures and reliable multimodal connectivity.
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam should compete on efficiency while cooperating through common regional standards. A genuinely integrated East African economy should allow cargo to choose the route that is fastest, cheapest and most reliable. In this sense, the ultimate victory will not belong to Kenya or Tanzania alone. It will belong to the regional system that succeeds in converting competition between corridors into connectivity between economies.
References
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